EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The U.S. military is increasingly involved in supporting military operations in regions of the world where it has had no presence. These isolated areas often have poorly developed infrastructures. The high levels of required logistical support place a heavy burden on the Joint Force Commander responsible for operations in the region. Analyzing these issues within the framework of an isolated, underdeveloped region provides insight into logistical solutions. Solid coordination among the Department of Defense, other U.S. government agencies, the private sector and allied foreign governments can provide more efficient and cost effective operational logistics. Well organized logistics allows the Joint Force Commander to focus on his primary task-accomplishing the goals of the mission.
OVERVIEW
Since the end of World War II, the U.S. military has developed and refined a logistics network that was primarily designed to support military operations countering a Soviet threat. In this current post-Cold War era, logistics is being reengineered to reflect the changing landscape. Over the last half century, the potential for conflict in Eastern Europe was very real. Now the possibility of military operations in other regions such as the Middle East appears more likely.
Chances are high that the U.S. military will be called increasingly to conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW) in geographic locations where American forces have not had a traditional presence.
Wherever a military operation transpires, the framework of logistical support highlighted in Joint Publication 4-0 remains the same: Logistics will be required to support an operation's material efforts and arrange for personnel movement, evacuation and hospitalization. Logistics will also be called on to organize the services and facilities essential to an operation.
Yet in a region where the U.S. military has had no traditional presence, it will be much more difficult for joint forces to provide logistical support. First, the military's inexperience in the region means that troops will need to calculate the particular geographic and culture issues that will affect logistical operations.
Second, the likelihood is high that a region with no former U.S. military presence will require an abnormally high level of logistical support because it may be geographically isolated with a poorly developed infrastructure.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight potential logistical problems affecting the Joint Force Commander (JFC) when logistics are required to support operations in areas lacking a logistics infrastructure. In these situations, the need for logistical support is particularly heavy and risks imposing requirements that draw the JFC's focus away from his primary mission. By considering these problems and exploring possible solutions outlined in this paper, a JFC's staff can work to recognize and avoid the most common problems encountered with establishing logistical support in a new region. This paper is not aimed at providing tactical guidance on establishing a new logistical network. Rather, it is designed to outline operational choke points on the road map-problems, when identified and solved, that can lead to a more efficient and cost-effective flow of supplies and material, thereby removing or reducing the impact on the JFC, his staff and his components.
UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM
To understand the challenges of establishing a supply network in a new geographic location, it is important to lay out a number of logistical assumptions.
( 
DEVELOPING THE SOLUTIONS
The JFC and his staff must pay particular attention to these assumptions in ensuring that their operation's logistics successfully tap the military's worldwide support network. A MOOTWs limited scope means that valid logistical assumptions at the outset make the difference between success and failure. An inability to calculate initial logistical delays may mean that supplies are simply not on site when they are needed the most. In such situations there is the risk that the cost of emergency supply of a limited operation will then be so resource intensive that decision-makers would be willing to sacrifice goals, achieving either only limited success or measured failure.
To avoid the potential delays a logistical operation in a new geographic region may experience, a JFC staff must achieve success in five areas: (1) Establish a detailed transportation network for troops and supplies arriving from CONUS (2) Develop overall rules of the game. That is, create a bilateral or multilateral framework that will govern the international transit and end use of the logistical supplies. Needless to say, these issues play a role in nearly every logistical operation.
Their importance in this paper is that these factors can vary considerably when a logistical operation is established in a new geographic location.
ESTABLISHING A TRANSPORTATION NETWORK FROM CONUS
Creating a transportation network to serve a new geographic location can be a daunting task. The major question when considering inter and intra-theater movement is which modes of transportation can be used based on topography.
Are shipments by air, sea, rail and truck all possible? Next up are climactic factors. Do high snowfall, ice and poor road maintenance preclude overland shipment in the winter? Do the poorly developed port facilities mean that sea shipments will likely spend extended periods on the dock awaiting transshipment during the monsoon season? In high sea states can Joint Logistics over Shore (JLOTS) be used?
Cost factors also weigh into the equation. Transportation costs to an isolated location may initially be difficult to calculate, as current commerce into the region may be limited. In addition, cost calculations may play out considerably differently from similar scenarios in the more developed world.
• • For instance, surface transportation via truck may be quicker than rail service, if rail service is available, but its cost in a developing area may be exponentially higher. Trucking firms may charge a premium for using their equipment in a hostile or developing region where these assets are at risk.
Similarly, in an area where trucks may transit a number of developing countries, the transportation firms may build in a financial buffer to cover costs of ensuring that foreign customs officials at intermediate points do not hold up the shipment.
Conversely, rail service, while a natural convenience for sending goods point-topoint in containers, may be a disadvantage over trucking service if the rail lines compel a logistics line to run through a country that would be inappropriate for the operation. In some cases, rail executives might find themselves in a near monopoly position and set rail tariffs at a level that would make truck service a cost advantage. Rail lines may not be quite point-to-point and require some offload and line-haul to a final destination.
A region's infrastructure is important in deciding modes of transportation.
Runways may not be large enough to accommodate all models of aircraft.
Poorly maintained off-load equipment, refueling capability, navigational beacons and primitive radar equipment may require airplane landings on instrumentation.
A primitive port facility may mean that large ships cannot dock and be offloaded pier-side. It is possible there may be no cranes for offloading standard containers. Once on the docks, goods may not be able to be easily transported inland, as the port may not have an established rail link or developed roads.
• A key for a JFC staff to establish a transportation link to a new region is to 
ESTABLISHING THE RULES OF THE GAME
It is important for the JFC to coordinate with the Defense and State
Departments to ensure that an operation's supplies underway are not delayed by allies or other foreign governments. Military supplies transported on longestablished routes are protected from foreign customs duties and delays through NATO and other status of forces agreements. However, when establishing
• logistical lines to new locations, these international legal agreements are often not in place.
In the arena of international law, it is important to remember that countries accede to and honor international agreements because it is in their interest to do so. For this reason, it is important that the negotiation of agreements allowing supply depots and importation of goods to support military operations lay out why it is in a foreign government's interest to support the operations and allow us to mold logistical lines that follow our procedures.
It should be noted that the degree of difficulty in negotiating such an agreement varies greatly according to the situation. In the heat of crisis, a foreign government may acquiesce to our importation requests simply to ensure U.S. support. Similarly, we may have no need to reach a formal agreement when dealing in a region with a disintegrating government or in the area of a combat zone. The greatest difficulty in reaching an agreement may be multilaterally or situations where there may be a peacetime need for establishing a supporting logistical base. In the former case, there is the inherent challenge of dealing with the often conflicting interests of a number of countries. In the later case, a country without an immediate security threat may be more interested in asserting its autonomy.
A JFC and unified CINC must make sure any agreement forged with foreign governments to expedite logistics is well coordinated among U.S. government agencies and is as all encompassing as possible. Optimally, resources should be expended to develop a bilateral or multilateral agreement that is enduring and need not be renegotiated for each future operation in the region. An agreement should leave flexibility to expand operations or alter operating procedures. If the U.S. military has a need to expand operations into a new region, it is likely it will be doing so at the request of a foreign government in that area. When another government requests U.S. participation in a region, it is the most opportune time to formulate a set of terms that would allow for the least possible bureaucratic set of procedures. Long-established agreements such as those used in NATO can also provide negotiators with a starting point. Key is to keep any agreement as simple and flexible as possible, while guaranteeing U.S. rights. Similarly, if the operation is of a significantly large scope, customs officials may be so overwhelmed with the volume of shipments that they may see the impracticality of holding up shipments. The greatest difficulties may be with small to moderately sized operations in the absence of an immediate and public threat.
BUILD SOLID WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND COALTION PARTNERS
In these situations, foreign customs officials may be willing to hold up shipments in pursuit of their own agendas.
In establishing a working relationship, it is important to understand the dynamics of their operations-what will drive the foreign customs officers to help us. Making them understand that special importation privileges have been granted from top levels of government is key. Building a sense of trust and cooperation is also important. It helps where feasible to follow special procedures a foreign customs may set forth, while vigorously working to change any procedures that may greatly add to a logistical operation's workload. For instance, a foreign customs may request an item-by-item list of goods to be imported duty free, whereas generic descriptions of shipments such as "office supplies" or "machine parts" would significantly reduce paperwork for both sides.
Working with coalition partners also has unique benefits and challenges.
Coalition partners may be more experienced in conducting business in a region and may have positive input for establishing a new logistics supply line. At the same time, foreign partners may bring some interests and procedures to the table that differ from the U.S.'s. In these situations a cooperative compromise may be necessary. Equally important is recognizing that U.S. forces often use different equipment following different procedures. The right mix of supplies thus needs to be incorporated into the logistics supply line.
COORDINATING OPERATIONS WITH CONTRACTORS
The military drawdown means the Defense Department turns increasingly to private contractors to provide support for overseas operations. The increased flexibility gained through contractor use carries with it some special challenges for an operation that established supply support to a new region of the world.
Just as the military will experience a learning curve, a private contractor must also gain experience in the region. To guarantee success of the operation, the JFC staff must work closely with contractors to ensure that efforts are coordinated and everyone understands mission, tasks, goals and intent.
Shipping contracts should not be based solely on price, as may be the case in a more developed region, but also on quality performance. Since the contractor may be operating in the region for the first time as well, performance must be closely monitored and the contractor's assumptions vigorously examined.
Success of a mission is ultimately based on on-time performance. Assessing contractor penalties for not attaining its goals in a timely manner is not the quid pro quo tradeoff that can often be accepted in a more developed peace time environment. Supply delays can pose significant hardships in regions with poorly developed infrastructure.
It is important to recognize that contractor problems may be more likely to develop with smaller projects than with larger ones. With a mega contract, a transportation contractor has a great incentive to send a representative to a new region to develop a new supply line and solve its quirks on site. Similarly, at the smallest micro level a one-time shipment could be organized relatively easily through a commercial courier. For operations of a magnitude in-between, the difficulties are that a contractor may be working off a list of faulty assumptions but may not find the volume of the project a large enough incentive to send on-site representatives. In these cases, contractors may simply turn to industry sources and subcontract the arrival delivery work to a foreign firm that for instance may simply be listed as a contact in the American Movers' Association guide.
Delayed performance by the sub-contractor may mean the contractor can be penalized, but that it no substitute for having the work completed in a timely manner.
Similarly, a firm's current performance levels may need to be closely examined. For instance, a current government contractor for domestic courier service may advertise service to a region where a new logistics line is being established. For domestic offices, the fact that the courier firm is used on a daily basis and advertise service to the region, may tend to funnel courier shipments through that firm. However, the courier service may not necessarily be able to offer the best service to the region, if it is encountering its own start-up problems in the area.
EXERTING INTERNAL FLEXIBILITY WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION
To successfully establish a supply line in a new geographic location, there must be a flexibility to tailor internal regulations to the success of the mission. An 
